Wilson's Food for Thought

So I was thinking . . . Callie has been sharing her work during this semester complete with pictures and descriptions and recipes, and I thought that I might do the same.  Obviously, my work has been more theoretical and certainly less satisfying in terms of your ability to eat it, but I wanted to share a little of what I've been thinking about and working on over the course of this past term.  

The paper below was written for my class in "Australia in Diplomacy, Defence and Trade," which was a survey of Australia's regional and international foreign policy involvement since the time of Federation.  I know that it's a little longer than normal posts, but I hope it provides some understanding of Australia's strategic worldview and offers a window into my work during our time in Australia.  While it is unquestionably less appetizing than Callie's work, I hope that it is equally informative.  Enjoy.

The Case for Continuity: A Historical Examination of Australia's Foreign Policy

Introduction
Over the relatively brief historical period since Federation in 1901, Australia has accumulated a significant body of foreign policy experience. From its considerable involvement in the First World War to the current military deployment in Afghanistan, from helping institutionalize the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation to managing the Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, Australia has exercised a substantial role both within its region and in relation to the broader international system. While policies have often been revised, adjusted, or redefined in response to particular circumstances or to meet the political proclivities of individual governments, Australia’s strategic thinking reflects a remarkable degree of consistency. This is not to suggest that Australia’s foreign policy has not changed over the last century because it certainly has. Rather, throughout history, Australia seems to exhibit similar concerns and priorities relative to its international position and geo-strategic interests, thereby imbuing its foreign policy with a general sense of continuity.

Due to its limited influence as an international middle power and its geographic position between Asia and North America, Australia is confronted with a peculiar tension. The United States is Australia’s closest strategic ally, a military and economic relationship that has been vigorously cultivated over the last century. However, Australia is geographically positioned on the edge of Asia, a region that is now commanding a greater proportion of Australia’s economic interest and resources. While this particular tension is a more recent development in Australian foreign relations, Australians have always demonstrated an awareness of their precarious strategic environment (Gyngell and Wesley 2007). Fearful of great power conflict or uncertain about regional instability, Australia appears to be acutely cognizant of its changing surroundings, which provides the basis for understanding the continuity in its foreign relations.

Specifically, Australia’s foreign policy reveals a commitment to multilateralism and the use of international institutions, an inclination towards more assertive and activist decision- making, a disposition towards pragmatic policy thinking, and a penchant for “coalition-building diplomacy” (Gyngell and Wesley 2007). These common policy features are shaped by Australia’s external geo-strategic environment, and they are derived from Australia’s broader desire for regional stability and normalized relations. The following essay will explore three areas of foreign policy that evidence this tendency: the strategic alliance with the U.S., the relationship with Indonesia concerning the situation in East Timor, and the deepening economic cooperation with China. In each of these instances, as with other foreign policy events throughout its history, Australia has exhibited a consistent commitment to maintain a sense of strategic equilibrium, and it is this interest in regional stability and cooperation which upholds the thesis of continuity.

Strategic Partners: The U.S. Alliance
Arguably the most important component of Australia’s external relations is the alliance with the United States. Beginning with the arrival of the Great White Fleet in 1908 and particularly due to America’s action in arresting Japanese aggression in the South Pacific during World War II, Australia became and has remained a loyal partner of the United States (Alves 1993). Moreover, with the ascendancy of the U.S. in the post-war world, the Australia-U.S. relationship developed into a way for Australia, by joining with a larger power, to protect both itself and its regional interests (Tow & Albinski 2002). As such, the Australia-U.S. relationship is the basis for ensuring Australia’s strategic protection and stability. In terms of security continuity, Australia has fought beside the United States in every major military conflict from Korea to the current War in Iraq. Australia and the U.S. share a binding defence agreement in the ANZUS Treaty. And every government- both Labor and Coalition- have, with varying degrees of intensity, supported the U.S. alliance (Edwards 2005). More recently, with the events of 11 September 2001, the bilateral relationship between Australia and the U.S. has intensified as Australia enthusiastically joined the “coalition of the willing” in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, Australia has been an active partner in terms of supporting the Bush Administration’s anti-terrorism policy in the region, and both nations have increased intelligence sharing and defence force cooperation (Bell 2007). While there are obvious challenges and points of divergence within the Australian-American relationship, such as in regards to China and the prospect of global power redistribution, there can be little doubt that sustaining such a relationship, at least for now, is necessary to protect Australia’s regional security interests (Edwards 2005).

In terms of economic continuity, Australia’s alliance arrangement with the U.S. has facilitated stable trade relations both between Australia and North America and between Australia and the Asia-Pacific. While a formal free trade agreement between Australia and the U.S. was not codified until 2004, the U.S. has always been a significant market for Australian exports and a source of high-quality goods and services (Gyngell and Wesley 2007, DFAT Country). Furthermore, thanks to the wider U.S. bilateral alliance system, Australia has been able to enjoy stable trade relations with U.S. partners in the region, specifically Japan and South Korea who rank first and fourth respectively as the top destination for Australian exports (DFAT Trade). In terms of a specific policy action that indicates continuity, Australia’s support for the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is highly instructive. Wanting to avoid East Asian economic asymmetry should the United States withdraw from the region following the end of the Cold War, Australia effectively lobbied to incorporate the U.S. into the regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific (Gyngell and Wesley 2007). On the surface, such a position reveals Australia’s reliable commitment to the U.S., but at a deeper level, it demonstrates Australia’s underlying concern about the prospect of regional imbalance. With the creation of APEC, Australia is able to enjoy a forum that engages the U.S. as a counterweight to the economic powers in East Asia, which is congruent with Australia’s guiding overall interest in strategic equilibrium.

Indonesia and the Case of East Timor
As Australia’s largest regional neighbor, Indonesia has been a long-standing source of concern and anxiety for Australian policy makers, and no one area was more problematic than the situation in East Timor (McDougall 2007; Ayson 2007). Before 2000, Australia, wanting to “maintain a strong bilateral relationship”, had supported Indonesia’s territorial incorporation of East Timor with very few reservations (Goldsworthy 2003). According to James Cotton, “governments of both persuasions had regarded the question of positive relations with Indonesia to be of far greater moment than the right to self-determination of the East Timorese” (2001). This policy stance unequivocally supports the notion of continuity developed earlier, as Australia was acting in such a way to preserve stable relations between states. However, as the situation deteriorated, with reports of mass killings, forced starvation and sexual violence against the East Timorese, Canberra did gradually adjust its position. Australia supported an act of self-determination for the East Timorese, and following a period of election violence and intimidation, actually led a UN peacekeeping operation know as UNAMET (Cotton 2001). While this adjustment apparently undermines the continuity in Australian thinking, the change is nonetheless compatible with Australia’s attention to wider regional interests.

In the period before 2000, Australian policy continuity relative to Indonesia was easily identifiable. As previously mentioned, Australia was more concerned about preserving stable relations with Indonesia, particularly given the negotiations of the Timor Gap Treaty that would give Australia claim to potentially undiscovered petroleum reserves. Furthermore, within the wider conditions of the Cold War, Australia was not inclined to confront a regime that was fighting- albeit brutally- against communist expansion. Thus, Australia’s action can been observed as seeking to safeguard regional balance at the expense of East Timor’s sovereignty. Once Australia began to incrementally redefine its policy, however, continuity, although still present, was somewhat more difficult to identify. First of all, the change in Australia’s position was arguably encouraged by growing international pressure to resolve the crisis (Goldsworthy 2003). Within this context, Australia’s actions helped diffuse such pressure, thereby returning a sense of stability to the region. At the same time, Australia’s leadership in UNAMET focused specifically on incorporating the operation’s ASEAN representatives, a gesture that signaled a commitment to coalition-building diplomacy and wider regional engagement (McDougall 2007; Goldsworthy 2003). Lastly, subsequent Australian governments have been conspicuously silent in pursing accountability for Indonesian leadership for the atrocities in East Timor, which seemingly supports the notion that Australia is still concerned about not upsetting the sensitivities of its largest neighbor (Akerman 2008). Thus, while Australia did alter its position towards Indonesia and East Timor, it did so in such a way that upheld its geo-strategic interests by assuaging international concern and facilitating regional cooperation- both of which helped stabilize relations.

Growing Economic Cooperation: China
There is perhaps no better example of Australia’s pragmatic desire to maintain strategic balance than its policy towards China. Undoubtedly precipitated by the incredible expansion in trade, Australia’s current relationship with China has “deepened and broadened to an extent that few observers had forseen” (Zhang 2007; Frost 2007). China is now Australia’s second largest trading partner, driven primarily by China’s seemingly unquenchable demand for energy and mineral resources, and this increasing economic cooperation has encouraged greater political, security, and cultural integration (DFAT Trade; Zhang 2007). However, Australia’s relationship with China has not always been harmonious, as Australia is particularly vulnerable to acrimony in U.S.-China relations (Malik 2001). As discussed earlier, Australia has been willing to diverge from specific U.S. interests, and this divergence, on several key policy issues related to China, provides considerable evidence of Australia’s longstanding commitment to regional stability.

Foremost, Australia has been more openly conciliatory “towards Beijing on such sensitive issues as human rights, the future of Taiwan, and North Korea” (Bell 2007). These positions are visibly incongruent with U.S. policy, but from Australia’s perspective, they are necessary to manage the inherent economic and political asymmetry in Australia-China relations (Tow 2008; Zhang 2007). In other words, Australia is forced to moderate its policy towards China because of its economic dependence and geographic proximity, which reinforces the stability continuity thesis. Additionally, Australia was strongly supportive of China’s bid to join the World Trade Organization and to host the 2008 Olympic Games. These actions demonstrate a practical attention to the Australia-China relationship, as “Canberra displayed an increasing willingness to accommodate China’s growing influence in the region” (Zhang 2007). The result has been increased high-level government visits, institutionalized dialogue, people-to-people networking, and the beginnings of negotiations on a free trade agreement (Zhang 2007). Each of these developments has augmented the bilateral relationship between Australia and China, and in so doing, it helps protect against the prospect of significant regional disturbance. Thus, as with other areas of Australian foreign relations, continuity exists in the dominant commitment to preserve regional constancy.

Conclusions
In the final analysis, continuity in Australian foreign affairs is defined not by an unwavering or inalterable commitment to any one country or policy, but rather it is characterized by an enduring commitment to maintain balance in its strategic environment. Given its relative size and strength, Australia simply cannot afford to offend or alienate its larger regional neighbors, and this reality is specifically visible in Australian policy towards the U.S., Indonesia and China. The inevitable consequence of this situation is that Australia’s interests are best served by managing its external affairs in an extremely careful and pragmatic way so as to preserve stable relations. Australia’s use of coalition-building diplomacy and its affection for multilateral institutions are explicit manifestations of these interests, and while there may be policy inconsistencies towards an individual country or issue (such as with the aforementioned case of East Timor), the broader commitment to stability permeates Australia’s thinking. Certainly the desire for regional equilibrium is not uniquely Australian; understandably, most countries seek stable foreign relations. However, with Australia’s precarious position juxtaposed between the competing loyalties of North America and Asia, strategic balance is a greater imperative if Australia is to thrive in the times ahead.

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